

Sherman's Horsemen by David Evans, page 439. Sketch by Capt. Robert Burns, 4th Michigan, depicting the area of battle on August 20, 1864. Note the troop alignment south of McDonough Road, right & left of Lee's Mill Road.

Confederate Infantry had a limited role?

Lamar states:

“The Battle of Nash Farm is known as the most massive cavalry action in Georgia and one of the most memorable in the entire Civil War. This battle should not be confused with the skirmish that took place prior to the forces reaching Nash Farm.” However, *Lamar* also quotes Major Frank Mix (4th Michigan) stating, “The battle (charge) lasted only thirty minutes.”

From the Henry Battlefield website:

Evidence for the presence of infantry troops was given by many spent and/or unfired Enfield-type and Springfield U.S. Arsenal-type bullets. The Confederate infantry was involved in the August 20th engagement, although its role in the heart of the battle may have been somewhat limited. Both Union and Confederate infantry probably were involved in skirmishes in the study area during the September 2-5th engagement.

The *Lamar* Summary page, posted at the website makes factual statements concerning lack of preservation efforts toward Civil War sites. However, the attention drawn to preservation indicates a purpose other than strict historical analysis.

In their landmark study of the archaeological resources in the Flint River watershed, Elliott and Dean (2006:14) observed that,

Lovejoy is an area of the Flint River watershed that has experienced major urban development over the past two decades and the landscape has been radically transformed from rural to urban at an accelerated rate over the past five years. Archaeological resources associated with the battle at Lovejoy are rapidly dwindling as a result of this development.

The passage of only two years since that fieldwork was conducted has witnessed even more cultural resource destruction in the Lovejoy area—making this prediction even more dire. The Nash Farm Battlefield Park represents a wonderful opportunity to address this threat to our shared heritage and capture and preserve a significant piece of this fast-disappearing epic story. Battlefield-related or campsite-related artifacts were discovered in nearly every area of the property that was examined. Clearly, many more hundreds, if not thousands, of battlefield artifacts remain buried on the park property.

Lamar and Henry County provide some inconsistencies with the historical record regarding the Union movements on August 19th, and finally converging on Lovejoy's Station about 11:00am on August 20th. Reporting the 30-minute, Union saber charge as “*the battle*” places far too little significance upon the day's preceding engagements. It also fails to point out that Ross's men fired one shot and then fled into the woods with all due haste. While Young's 12-pounder continued to blast into the Union forces, that

knoll was soon overtaken. It fails to acknowledge that Captain Beebe's cannon reigned canister and shot to the north and east, mounted Union troops chased the scattering Confederates into the woods, and Eli Long's troops remained in the area to cover the Union flank. These facts would account for the presence of rifle shot and canister artifacts along that stretch of Lee's Mill Road leading to the present Nash farmhouse. The "skirmishes" actually began at 2:00pm with the saber charge and lasted until Kilpatrick's flank left the area about 5:00pm.

Background of the Day's Events

The Battle of Lovejoy's Station must be viewed in terms of raids and engagements in late July and late August. The object of Union desires was the supply line provided by rail tracks, and Lovejoy provided a supply and troop line via the Macon and Western Railroad. The accounts must include troop movements and engagements from Jonesboro to Lovejoy.

On July 27th – 29th the action was moving eastward from Fayetteville. At the head of the column, Jim Brownlow's 1st Tennessee surprised and captured another 500 Confederate wagons parked east of Fayetteville on the McDonough Road. Leaving the wagons for the rear guard to burn, the 1st Tennessee pressed ahead. A drove of Rebel officers, clerks and teamsters fleeing across the Flint River tried to set fire to Dickson's Bridge, four miles east of Fayetteville, but Jim Brownlow boldly led a charge through the flames scattering defenders and putting out the flames.

The rest of Croxton's brigade followed close behind, striking the Macon & Western Railroad a half mile north of Lovejoy's Station at 7:00am. After cutting the telegraph wires and posting pickets, Croxton sent Major Russell Thornburgh's battalion of the 1st Tennessee and Major Richard Root's 2nd battalion of the 8th Iowa down to the station, where they destroyed the depot, water tank and woodshed, \$300,000 worth of cotton, two trains loaded with an estimated \$100,000 to \$120,000 worth of tobacco, large quantities of bacon, lard, salt, and ordinance, and almost a mile of track. Torrey's brigade arrived about 10:00am and joined the work, but the rest of McCook's column was strung out all the way back to Fayetteville and beyond. At noon on July 29th, Ed McCook and Jim Brownlow had taken dinner at Judge Stephen G. Dorsey's house.

The events surrounding the area of the Flint River, Panhandle Road and McDonough Road toward Lovejoy's Station saw fierce engagements involving Sul Ross's Texas cavalry pitted against Union cavalry and infantry.

In late July at Fayetteville Union forces captured 500 Confederate supply wagons. Fighting and skirmishes continued across the Flint River and into the Panhandle Road area of Lovejoy. In late August, upon arrival at the Station, Union troops were met by about 300 Confederate infantrymen and were forced to fall back and establish a battle front some 300 yards north of the Station. Union and Confederate forces continued to arrive and fighting literally raged for the next three hours. Kilpatrick himself arrived about noon, having skirmished with Ross's Confederates since about 7:00am in the

area of Noah's Ark Church near Lee's Mill. Union commanders overestimated as many as 20,000 Confederates had surrounded their forces. By 2:00pm the decision was made to break out of a losing situation and proceed into McDonough.

August 20th – The Battle

The follow excerpts taken from *Sherman's Horsemen* clearly detail the battle of Lovejoy's Station was not simply a "skirmish" as *Lamar* indicates.

August 20, 1864 Union raiders again converged on Lovejoy's Station. While claiming to be a Union sympathizer, Dorsey feared arrest and fled at their approach, leaving behind his wife Lucinda and three children sick with the measles.

Soon afterward a horde of Union raiders descended on his [the Dorsey] yard. Crowding around the smokehouse they began filling canteens and buckets with syrup and pulling out sides of bacon packed in barrels. They ransacked his house and scooped a hog shed full of flour into pillow cases. They took crockery, tin ware, and clothing and bed linens.

Just beyond the Dorsey's house, the road from Lee's Mill crossed the Fayetteville-McDonough Road. When the first Yankees approached the intersection at 11:00am, about a dozen of "Red" Jackson's Confederate scouts, who had been hovering just outside rifle range all morning, opened fire. That brought Minty and his staff to the front to find Captain Dartt's battalion fighting on foot. The skirmish was soon over, but before Dartt's men moved south they heard an approaching locomotive. Minty directed Frank Mix's 4th Michigan to the right of the Fayetteville-McDonough Road with orders to cut the track. He also detached Lieutenant William Webb's 3rd battalion of the 4th Regulars to watch the roads.

Mix ordered Captain Eldridge's 3rd battalion of the 4th Michigan to form an extended line on both sides of the Fayetteville-McDonough Road. Eldridge's troopers forged through the woods and fields for about three-quarter mile and reached the railroad without meeting opposition. Minty brought up Captain Van Antwerp's 2nd battalion to reinforce them, and assigned the rest of his regiment to wreck the tracks McCook's men had razed only three weeks before.

Dartt's battalion encountered a squad of mounted Rebels and gave chase, but stopped about 20 rods from the station. The train carrying Dan Reynolds's Confederate infantry from Jonesboro rolled into Lovejoy's about 11:00am. "Red" Jackson rode up shortly and ordered Reynolds to deploy his men on the east side of the track.

To make his gray line longer, Reynolds deployed his infantry in a single rank. He had 300 rifles waiting when Captain Vale's company of the 7th Pennsylvania came trotting toward the depot. Minty's adjutant, Captain Robert Burns, rode back to have more men sent as reinforcements when, "a *devil* of a fusillade took place."

The hail of lead ripped through Vale's ranks. The rest of Dartt's battalion dismounted and rushed into line about 600 yards from the depot. Minty brought up the rest of the 7th Pennsylvania to clear the woods, but the command Lieutenant George Robinson of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery (CBOT) heard pass down was "Fours, left about." He faced his artillery to the rear (east). At the head of the column the rest of the 7th Pennsylvania soon dismounted and moved into line alongside Dartt's men. Gunfire continued to echo in the woods to the right. Minty dispatched Eli Long's 1st and 2nd battalions of the 4th Regulars forward. He sent a mounted squadron of Regulars to anchor the left and directed Captain McIntyre to take the rest of the regiment into the woods to extend the line to the right.

The Regulars dismounted but before they could tie their horses, Reynolds's infantry came charging through the woods. On the right of the Rebel line, Lt. Colonel Henry Evans had deployed three companies of the 48th Tennessee as flankers, instructing Captain Cantrell to maintain contact with the right of the regiment while moving forward. Approaching Minty's line at an oblique angle these three companies triggered a rolling volley that raked the 7th Pennsylvania and 4th Regulars from left to right at a range less than 150 yards.

Minty's men fired rapidly, emptying the last rounds from the seven-shot magazines of their Spencers. Before they could reload, howling Rebels were on them with fixed bayonets. There was a fence surrounding a large cornfield to the left of the Lovejoy Road where men were waiting with the led horses. They were told that Hays, Foster and the rest of the boys were all killed or captured.

Lieutenant George Robinson of the CBOT was awaiting orders. Eli Long's Ohio brigade came down the road from Lee's Mill at a trot. Robinson turned his guns toward the only open ground in sight, a cornfield about 400 yards long and half as wide on the south side of the road. Henry Bennett's section rolled up and went into action in the center of the cornfield, hurling a salvo of shells at the Confederates.

The firing in front was now very rapid and yells of the Rebels almost appalling," said Private Wulsin; "stragglers began to appear and we were in danger of breaking. Men from each company near the head of the column dismounted and rushed forward into the woods. They had gone about 100 yards when a mob of Minty's men burst from the woods, running pell mell, every man for himself.

Rallying on the left of Long's line, Lieutenants Hedrick and Rief brought up portions of Companies C and K of the 4th Ohio, the cavalrymen poured a furious fire into the oncoming Confederates.

The Union line staggered. Captain Thompson's squadron of the 4th Ohio was cut off. Thompson was captured. The men began falling back, firing carbines as they went, and then paused to rally on either side of the CBOT battery.

The 4th Regulars were reforming their ranks to the right and rear of the guns. Their retreat gave the CBOT a clear field of fire, and gunners began ramming double loads of canister just as the Rebel battle flags emerged from the woods at the west end of the field. There was a crashing volley of muskets, the wild rush of an infantry charge. The battery answered with lethal blasts of canister that scythed through the cornfield cutting down everything in its path.

Switching from canister to shell as the Rebels retired into the woods, the CBOT worked furiously. Again and again their four guns roared. One gun was damaged. The firing slacked. Suddenly the Rebels came out of the woods and in position under the fence along the road to the right. Robinson changed front to face the road and opened with canister again. Rails and splinters flew in every direction, but no sooner was the right flank cleared than the battery came under fire from the woods on the left. Swinging his guns around, Robinson was soon directing fire in three different directions.

The CBOT guns each fired seventy rounds of shell and canister. One piece was disabled, six or seven horses shot. Private Wygant was killed. Five other artillery men were wounded. The withering crossfire from the road and woods had driven back the dismounted cavalymen on both flanks. Robinson ordered the CBOT to fall back.

CBOT left their disable gun behind and withdrew about 100 yards to where Long and the 1st Ohio were waiting near the east end of the cornfield. They hunkered behind hastily built barricades as a flood of dismounted men, led horses and artillery passed. Then the Rebel infantry appeared. The 1st Ohio loosed a blazing volley at a range of only 100 feet. The Rebels pressed closer through the corn. As Captain Rea reported, "There was not more than 200 men in the regiment, but as often as the enemy advanced; when it was over we drove them back with terrible slaughter."

The 3rd Ohio had dismounted and deployed on the 1st Ohio's right, extending Long's line from the Lovejoy-Lee's Mill Road to the McDonough-Fayetteville Road. Robert King's 3rd battalion arrived shortly and sent the 92nd Illinois to hold the left. The 3rd and 5th Kentucky formed behind Minty and Long. Jones's 2nd Brigade was led by the 8th Indiana.

The Union reinforcements overlapped Reynolds's infantry by several hundred yards on both flanks. Reynolds halted 300 yards beyond the Griffin Road and retired to the tree line at the west end of the cornfield. He had sustained ten killed, thirty-seven wounded and one missing.

Troop Strength

All records provided by *Sherman's Horsemen, War of the Rebellion, History of Clayton County* and all other references clearly depict the Union forces aligned along the south side of McDonough Road, stretching from just north of Lovejoy's Station to the Dorsey House. As the Union forces were surrounded on three sides by Confederates, bullets and canister shot reigned down, and shots hit the Dorsey house.

Sherman's Horsemen (David Evans), page 473 offers information about the troop strengths actually present on August 20, 1864:

Confederate records make it clear that there was no infantry at Brown's Mill or at Sunshine Church, while Kilpatrick could truthfully claim he encountered Confederate foot soldiers at Jonesboro on the night of August 19th and at Lovejoy's Station on August 20th, he grossly overestimated their strength.

Citing Captain Hale of the 7th Pennsylvania, Rebel infantry at Lovejoy's was reinforced by Ross's and Ferguson's cavalry, Pat Cleburne's infantry, 12 pieces of artillery, Major Martin's cavalry and a brigade of Georgia militia. "It thus appears the Rebels had on the ground, now surrounding Kilpatrick, five brigades of infantry, 18 pieces of artillery, six brigades of cavalry, in all a force of 12,000 men of all arms."

This was patently incorrect. Other sources make it abundantly clear that Cleburne's infantry never left Atlanta. Martin's cavalry was with Joe Wheeler in Tennessee. Ferguson's brigade did not participate at Lovejoy's Station and the nearest brigade of Georgia militia was twenty miles away.

Sherman's Horsemen, page 474 continues ...

A Confederate soldier armed with a muzzle-loading rifle could fire from ranges at which a Yankee trooper could not effectively reply. Confederate General Dan Reynolds (who first met the Union forces at Lovejoy's about 11:00am) thought that made a difference. "My Enfield rifles were much more effective in the small timber than their short cavalry guns."

Still 4,000 Yankee cavalymen should have been more than a match for the 300 Rebel infantry they initially encountered at Lovejoy's Station.

The Henry County Battlefield website (<http://www.henrycountybattlefield.com/NashTexas.htm>) states

On the morning of the 20th, Union General Kilpatrick's cavalry was now facing an Arkansas infantry brigade that had dug itself in to defend the railroad at Lovejoy Station. Pursuing them were the four hundred horsemen of Ross's Cavalry Brigade. Caught between the Arkansas and the Texans, three regiments of Kilpatrick's Cavalry drew sabers and charged the cavalry hitting the 3rd Texas Cavalry Regiment.

The actual charge of Union forces across the field and along Lee's Mill Road was met by only four hundred dismounted Confederate cavalymen.

"Red" Jackson's infantry numbered about 300.

***Evidence supporting the placement of Sul Ross's line
Nearby the John Dorsey house, and not adjacent to the Nash farmhouse:***

From Sherman's Horsemen:

Just beyond the Dorsey's house, *the road from Lee's Mill crossed the Fayetteville-McDonough Road*. When the first Yankees approached the intersection at 11:00am, about a dozen of "Red" Jackson's Confederate scouts, who had been hovering just outside rifle range all morning, opened fire.

The county website and numerous publications continuously refer to "McDonough Road" interchangeably with Lee's Mill Road and Fosterville Road. The 1877 Ruger map is consistent with troop placements and battle orders describing the intersection of Lee's Mill with McDonough-Fayetteville Road. The McDonough-Fayetteville Road, or McDonough Road, ran east-west from Griffin Road (today's Hastings Bridge Road) and then south of Babbs "Old Mill", and then turned northeast to intersect Fosterville Road before going east into McDonough.

Confusion occurs when historians fail to refer to road location and routes as they existed at the time of the event. By using present-day road alignments, many with common names that were used in 1864, the casual observer easily mistakes the actual location of events.

Union Captain Beebe's battery was dueling with the Rebel artillery.

At the distance suggested by Henry County's website, Young's Confederate cannon stood atop a knoll, just yards away from the Nash farmhouse. In an artillery duel, the house would surely have been struck by Union cannon fire. No evidence of that shelling has been recorded.

The 4th Michigan and 7th Pennsylvania struck the Rebel line perhaps half a minute behind the Regulars, boring straight across a field at least a half-mile wide... [Sul Ross's] skirmishers fled before the Yankee onslaught without attempting to make a stand, *while his main line couched behind the hastily built barricade half-way across the field.*

The descriptions of the field, fences and slopes depict a charge of several hundred yards. If the Confederate cavalry was "half-way across the field" they were not aligned with Young's 12-pounder at the end of the field where present-day McDonough road curves northward and the Nash farmhouse stands only yards away.

Before they could reload, the Yankee horsemen were upon them. The Texans threw down their guns and ran. ... [Union] men were mounted and on the gallop and cut them down right and left.

Lt. Barron was among the last of Ross's men to reach the deep ditch fronting the fence on the far side of the field. At that instant a Rebel shell burst directly over Barron's head, showering his would-be captors with shrapnel. Falling on his right side to conceal the pistol he wore, he played possum as the *Yankee horsemen thundered past*.

This description of Union cavalry crushing the Confederates; and the distance to "the far side of the field," rule out the Confederate main line position as depicted by the county website overlay map.

Upon reaching the woods we could not go fast and could not keep in column. The troops became scattered, chasing dismounted and demoralized Texans in every direction.

The field across which the Charge was made was bordered by "the woods" as depicted in Captain Burns's sketch.

As they reached the woods, Frank Mix became separated from his command. *Off to the left, Ross's howitzer roared again.*

As Union cavalry chased retreating Confederates into the woods, they had come parallel with Young's position where the lone cannon set on a knoll in a stand of walnut trees.

As Thompson's captors hurried him away, Minty had the 'Rally' sounded. The bugle halted the 7th Pennsylvania in the woods at the end of the field. Minty ordered Major Jennings to *move to the left until he reached the main road*.

Using the county's depiction of the locations of the Confederate cannon and Ross's line across the curve in present-day McDonough Road, Minty could not move left to the main road unless he had already charged past the Nash farmhouse.

The 4th Ohio had already reached the thick woods on the far side of the field and filed to the left. Emerging behind the Rebel artillery, they found the main road crowded with galloping horsemen, waving their sabers and cheering.

The county's depiction of the cannon position and Ross's main line crossing the road and bending toward the Nash farmhouse is not consistent with this description. It would also place Ross's line at or in the wooded area depicted by the Burns sketch. The Nash farmhouse would have been in the woods.

Veterans' Accounts

Four Years in the Saddle. History of the First Regiment Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, compiled by W. L. Curry in 1898, quotes Lieutenant W. S. Scott of the First US Cavalry.

We now began to realize that we were surrounded, and the chances looked desperate, as our ammunition had already been pretty well exhausted, and we must cut our way through the lines. The distance between the two lines of the enemy could not have been more than three-fourths of a mile.

Finding himself [Kilpatrick] completely surrounded, he called his division commanders together and instructed them to cut their way out, designating as the point to strike an old deserted plantation.

The post-War description of the Charge by 2nd Lieutenant Samuel Benton Barron, Company C, 3rd Texas Cavalry provides further confirmation of the location of the Confederate line during the Charge.

The Brigade having not more than 400 men for duty was little more than a skirmish line. During the day General Hood placed General Reynolds' Arkansas Brigade at Lovejoy's Station. While we were showing our weakness in an open field one side, General Reynolds kept his men under cover of timber on the other.

Kilpatrick found himself between an unknown infantry force in front and a dismounted skirmish line of dismounted cavalry in his rear.

Being repulsed in the charge on the railworks, by a heavy fire of artillery and small arms, we fell back and reformed our line behind the first cross fence.

Three regiments of the enemy then rapidly moved out from behind their works, the 4th US, 4th Michigan and 7th Pennsylvania, and charged with sabers, in columns of fours, the three columns abreast. And Ross' brigade was there, and then literally run over, trampled under foot.


Just before the charge they shelled our horses in the lane, which consequently had been moved back. Kilpatrick's cavalry, after charging through the field, turned into the road and stampeded our horses.

The line was maintained intact for a few seconds, the men emptying their pieces at the heads of the columns. There was no time for reloading, and everyone instinctively started for the horses a mile in the rear, a half-mile of open field behind us.

The rattle of carbines rose to a steady roar. Ross's Texans answered with small arms and artillery. Bullets began smacking into the side of the Dorsey house.

The Confederate Enfield rifle could hit its target at 800 yards.


Distance from present Nash Farm position of Ross' Confederate Lines to McDonough-Fayetteville Road: About 1.5 miles. The distance is twice the reported "three-fourths of a mile" meaning, Henry County's placement of Ross's main line is too far to the east.



The distance from the County's stated position of Ross' Confederate line to the Crawford-Dorsey house is 1.0 mile.

In order to meet the estimated distances of "three-fourths of a mile between enemy lines" and "a half-mile of open field behind us" it is necessary to place Ross's Confederate line far to the west of the county's stated location at present Nash Farm.

The width of land lots and approximately 1,000 yards between the Crawford-Dorsey, John Dorsey and present Nash houses requires the Cavalry Charge engagement to have occurred one-quarter to one-half mile inside Clayton County.



(Distances calculated using Google Earth Measurements, MapQuest, Ruger 1877 Map)

Nash Farm Historical Marker

Neither the Georgia Historical Society nor the Georgia Battlefields Association placed the marker. The marker was placed by Henry County Government.



In part, the marker states, “Kilpatrick formed his compact columns on a ridge just west of the Nash Farm.” There is no comment, as found at the county website, stating the Union Charge actually happened on Nash Farm property. It is clear the language used would have been accepted by either historical organization.

In response to a query to Mr. Charlie Crawford, President of the Georgia Battlefields Association, the following information was provided:

“Georgia Battlefields Association did not place the marker. The marker was placed by Henry County using the pattern of the Georgia Historical Commission markers from the 1950s.

The Nash Farm buildings are post war, but the area appears on at least two maps: One by Captain Burns of the 4th Michigan Cavalry, which was involved in Kilpatrick's raid of late August 1864; and one from the Atlas of the Official Records, which shows the deployments of Federal and Confederate troops in early September 1864.

On 20 August 1864, Kilpatrick's Federal cavalry charged roughly west to east, from south of the Dorsey Farm in Clayton County onto and through what is currently the Nash Farm property. The battle was named after Lovejoy's Station because that was the closest landmark, even though it's a few miles to the west.

On 3 September 1864, S.D. Lee's Confederate infantry advanced roughly south to north across the Nash Farm property.

Georgia Battlefields Association works closely with the National Park Service.”

The Georgia Historical Society has maintained the Georgia Historical Marker Program since 1998. Prior to 1998, the Georgia Historical Marker Program was administered by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, and markers erected under that program remain the property of GA DNR. GHS does not have stated guidelines for battlefields, but they do require an application process. Guidelines include:

Subjects of only local significance, and without extended importance in the larger context of state, regional, or national history are not intended to be marked through the Georgia Historical Marker Program. Applications for churches, cemeteries, and schools must clearly demonstrate their significance beyond the local level to be considered for a marker.

- Unless there is sufficient documentary evidence to establish **authenticity without question**, no "firsts" will be marked.
- The Historical Marker Program is not intended to be used to erect monuments. Overly adulatory **language that departs** in any way from an objective and dispassionate recounting of the **historically documented facts** of a story in Georgia history will not be approved.

The GHS application process is stringent:

The core of the marker application, the historical document must be prepared with the same care and technique as a well-written research or term paper. Because the Georgia Historical Society strives for impeccable historical accuracy in its marker program, the subject must be thoroughly researched using primary and secondary sources (the use of oral histories and county histories without other corroborating evidence is discouraged). The narrative must be documented on a fact-by-fact basis with the use of footnotes, endnotes, or parenthetical citations that offer the source of each statement that is presented as fact within the historical document.

It is vital to the success of any marker application that the facts and assertions contained within the historical document can be authenticated or verified to the satisfaction of the Committee.

Mr. Dan Elliott of the Lamar Institute referenced “National Park Service procedure for battlefield analysis” in his comments at an internet site. The NPS websites offer a great deal of information pertinent to this discussion.

Lovejoy's Station is ranked Class D, having a limited influence on the outcome of the campaign or operation but achieving or affecting important local objectives.

Lovejoy's Station is a Civil War Battlefield. The Crawford-Dorsey house is listed as a Historic Place, which requires completely different selection criteria.

The area of Kilpatrick's Charge, however, was not significant to the objectives, tactics or outcome of the Atlanta Campaign, or to the Battle of Lovejoy's Station. Officially the Charge amounts to a footnote: "*finally fleeing to prevent encirclement.*"

At best, the 1,000 or so yards (2,000 if we actually include Nash property) would be included in the Study Area. However, it even fails the criteria of providing "more of the tactical context of a battle than does the core area." The Civil War Sites Commission listed seven criteria topics, none of which does the Nash property appear to meet.

Under no circumstances does Kilpatrick's Charge qualify as a core area of a battlefield. And, as the NPS 1993 Study found, "The core area is generally the part that should remain undisturbed, with less stringent and more diverse protection techniques usually appropriate for the remainder of the study area."

According to Heritage Preservation Services and the American Battlefield Protection Program of the National Park Service:

What are historic sites associated with battlefields?

Sites occupied before, during, or after a battle at which events occurred that had a direct influence on the tactical development of the battle, the outcome of the battle, or the immediate aftermath of a battle.

(<http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/2008grantsFAQ.htm>)

National Park Service listing for Lovejoy's Station

Other Names: None

Location: Clayton County

Campaign: Atlanta Campaign (1864)

Date(s): August 20, 1864

Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. H. Judson Kilpatrick [US]; Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson [CS]

Forces Engaged: Kilpatrick's Cavalry Division [US]; Jackson's Cavalry Division [CS]

Estimated Casualties: Unknown

Description: While Confederate Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler was absent raiding Union supply lines from North Georgia to East Tennessee, Maj. Gen. William Sherman, unconcerned, sent Judson Kilpatrick to raid Rebel supply lines. Leaving on August 18, Kilpatrick hit the Atlanta & West Point Railroad that evening, tearing up a small area of tracks. Next, Kilpatrick headed for Lovejoy's Station on the Macon & Western Railroad. In transit, on the 19th, Kilpatrick's men hit the Jonesborough supply depot on the Macon & Western Railroad, burning great amounts of

supplies. On the 20th, they reached Lovejoy's Station and began their destruction. Rebel infantry (Cleburne's Division) appeared and the raiders were forced to fight into the night, finally fleeing to prevent encirclement. Although Kilpatrick had destroyed supplies and track at Lovejoy's Station, the railroad line was back in operation in two days.

Result(s): Confederate victory

CWSAC Reference #: GA021

Preservation Priority: II.4 (Class D)

Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields

Prepared for

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate

Committee on Natural Resources, United States House of Representatives
the Secretary of the Interior

By the Staff of the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission

c/o National Park Service

P.O. Box 37127

Washington, DC 20013-7127

1993

<http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/cwsac/cws0-1.html>

The Commission ranked military importance of the 384 battles (and their associated battlefield sites) according to the relative influence each had on the outcome of its operation, campaign, or on the war. The Class A and B battlefields represent the principal strategic operations of the war. The Class C and D battlefields usually represent operations with limited tactical objectives of enforcement and occupation.

- 45 sites (12%) were ranked "A" (having a decisive influence on a campaign and a direct impact on the course of the war);
- 104 sites (27%) were ranked "B" (having a direct and decisive influence on their campaign);
- 128 sites (33%) were ranked "C" (having observable influence on the outcome of a campaign);
- 107 sites (28%) were ranked "D" (having a limited influence on the outcome of their campaign or operation but achieving or affecting important local objectives).

Because of their strategic character and national significance, the Class A and B sites should be an interest or responsibility of the Federal as well as state and local governments, non-profits, and other private entities. Generally, the Class C and D battlefields, representing tactical operations, were of state or local significance and should be a primary interest or responsibility of state or local governments, or of private entities.

In addition, Civil War battlefields possess important educational and interpretive dimensions that also contribute to their significance. Therefore, the Commission also classified the battlefields in

terms of related areas of military, economic, and social significance and the exceptional interpretive potential that each site might have. The most frequently identified issues and topics were:

- Loss of a significant military figure;
- Exceptional casualties;
- Important lessons in strategy or tactics;
- Unusual importance of the battle in the public mind;
- Effect on national politics or strategy;
- Significant involvement of minority troops; and
- High archeological potential.

What Was Considered a Site?

Battlefields were documented by the Commission at two levels based on careful examination of official records and other sources as well as using established survey and evaluation criteria these levels are the Study Area and Core Area.

- The **study area** of a battlefield includes all places related or contributing to the battle event: where troops deployed and maneuvered before, during, and after the engagement; it is the maximum delineation of the historical site and provides more of the tactical context of a battle than does the core area.
- The **core area** of a battlefield is within the study area and includes only those places where the combat engagement and key associated actions and features were located; the core area includes, among other things, what often is described as "hallowed ground."
- This distinction of study and core areas is important when planning a protection and preservation plan especially for the Class B, C, and D sites. The core area is generally the part that should remain undisturbed, with less stringent and more diverse protection techniques usually appropriate for the remainder of the study area.

There is a question as to the County's choice to erect the historical marker outside the normal and customary processes of either the Georgia Historical Society or the Georgia Battlefields Association. It is also curious the property bears a sign designating it as "Nash Farm Battlefield." An observer may conclude the stringent GHS tests "for impeccable historical accuracy," or specifically defined NPS criteria for "Study" vs. "Core" areas stood as prohibitions to naming the Nash property a *Battlefield*.

Summary

The desire to preserve history and culture is a huge task and it is usually a thankless endeavor. Losing nearly every vestige of Civil War venues and artifacts across Atlanta is a tragedy. It is tragic because today's youth are not taught about such things as *The Atlanta Campaign* in school. Cultural and social engineering is a very real factor in America, and attempts to secure histories, lessons and truths about the Confederate human condition are simply not a priority. When this property came into the spotlight and eminent domain appeared the only way to secure something of this heritage, controversy immediately arose. Yet for many the encroachment on other battlefields like Gettysburg was enough to support the measure. For others it was easy to rally for something only Southerners steeped in tradition and rooted by ancestors to the Lost Cause could understand.

Anyone defending the use of eminent domain faced ridicule. The act of taking property away from a private citizen, regardless of compensation, was the first offense people opposed. Whether there was historic and cultural significance to this piece of land even became fodder for barbershop conversations. Another point grabbing naysayers was the cost - \$8 million for what some perceived as another unneeded park.

In preparing this analysis it became such a challenge to ferret out details that years of genealogical research and techniques were called upon. Locating land deeds was especially frustrating because so many were burned by those Yankee pyromaniacs. Matching Henry and Clayton land lot maps to roads and descriptions was actually a routine task, though one lady at the Georgia Archive gave some puzzled looks. (Can anyone tell about Lee's Mill? It was somewhere north of Noah's Ark Church near Lake Jodeco.)

The day involved a few thousand yards of Georgia red clay; and, a thousand men striving to defend against a ruthless Enemy. It was hand-to-hand. It was brutal. But it was real and nobody, for any reason including preservation, should denigrate the heroic measures those Johnny Rebs provided with each successive charge through the woods, cane and corn fields. They did not require 20/20 hindsight, and they did not care "how they do things up North." They were defending the last vestiges of a life and a culture.

There is no sufficient way to lament trailer parks and spray fields occupying truly hallowed ground. Knowingly grasping for progress or utilitarian ends at the cost of cultural anchors may be hard to accept. But it is fact. It is a social and political agenda that must be recognized. Yet there is no rationale for failing to fully study and research a locality in our own backyard.

Also hard to accept is how our county creates positions, hires consultants, develops plans and spends enormous amounts of money to no real end. It was to be a special place for sponsored events and even tourism. Grants and even federal earmarks were sought. The Battlefield was eventually declared a county park, yet the gates remain locked. This analysis used the same references and documentation available to the county and its consultants. The analyst is an amateur historian, but with a little tenacity the truth is easier to understand when the facts are presented openly and honestly.

There is no question that Union and Confederate skirmishes, camps and retreats occurred all across Henry County. The accounts are well documented.

During the War such things as Land Lots and county boundaries did not matter. In cases of union raids, they followed supply routes and particularly the railroads. Kilpatrick's raid through McDonough in late August simply took him back to the Union main lines near Lithonia.

Lovejoy saw several engagements from July to November wherein troops formed lines, camped and retreated. The last such stand was in November as Hardee's Division retreated from Jonesboro to Lovejoy's Station. Sherman's army was leaving Atlanta and met Hardee at Lovejoy. In Sherman's own memoirs he stated the Confederates gave a "fighting retreat" from Lovejoy to Macon.

Worthy of note are the troop positions drawn by Edward Ruger. The route was south from Jonesboro along the Macon & Western Railroad. The target was the depot and tracks at Lovejoy's Station. Ruger's depiction showed the Crawford-Dorsey house to the east, and McDonough-Fayetteville Road to the west.

"Ground Zero" moved with each engagement, but always followed the railroad. Likewise, recorded boundaries of engagement focused on the Dorsey house and surrounding property from Kilpatrick's Raid through Hardee's retreat.

In all, less than 1,000 Confederate soldiers mounted a battle of significant importance against Union forces numbering about 4,000. Tenacity and dedication; relentless pursuit of their Enemy; valor – these are words to describe these men. For those who survived it is one of many such places that must not be forgotten. For those who paid the ultimate sacrifice, this ground is truly hallowed.

Today we must recant the events with every map, written account, diary or letter that contributes to describing these brave souls and their service. It is therefore our duty to history and their posterity to portray events where and how they actually happened.

The Battle of Lovejoy's Station is so named because that was the target and location of the battle. History records Kilpatrick's Raid away from Lovejoy's but no map or book, except those commissioned by Henry County government; reference the present Nash property as a battlefield.

There was a reason two land lots surrounding Lovejoy's Station were annexed into Clayton County in 1877. There is reason the history and tradition is so well documented for places like Jonesboro and Lovejoy. The aftermath did spill into Henry County, but the facts are clear: the railroad was the primary target, and the real battle on August 20, 1864 occurred in Clayton County.

Larry Stanley
McDonough, Georgia